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Introduction 
Principally, professional team sports are heavily linked to the concepts of uncertainty of 
outcome, competitive balance and profit and utility maximisation, and there is extensive 
literature relating to professional team sports in this context (e.g. Buraimo, Frick and 
Hickfang and Simmons, 2015; Fort, 2015; Kesenne, 2015; Leach and Szymanski, 2015; 
Sloane, 2015; Vrooman, 2015). Professional sports league are primarily structured in such 
ways to drive fan engagement and to make the sport an attractive 'product' for consumers. 
However, the way in which certain leagues are structured ultimately has implications for the 
relative success or failure of individual clubs competing within the league. According to 
Thomas (1997) the sporting firm can be viewed as the 'league' which produces 'joint' products 
to insure matches are played between teams in a season-long competition. The problem here 
is that whilst individual club objectives may be assumed by their ability to win matches and 
therefore finish higher in the league than their rivals, there is also a vested interest for the 
ongoing success of the league competition (see El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971).  
For the organising body the fundamental purpose of the league is to be attractive, with 
balanced competition and an uncertainty of outcome of its matches. Therefore, it appears 
relevant for governing bodies to organise and control the league in order to meet its 
objectives. Economic literature accepts that sport leagues require a greater level of 
collaboration and co-operation between its member clubs (rival firms) than most other sectors 
of business (Borland and McDonald, 2003; Neale, 1964). As Hogan, Massey, Massey (2013) 
indicate, it is only by acting collectively that a league and its member clubs can complete a 
full roster of games resulting in end of season titles through competition that it is attractive to 
fans, sponsors and broadcasters. 
Literature on professional team sports is primarily associated with the importance of 
uncertainty of outcome, the maintaining of competitive balance or the largely theoretical 
research on salary caps (see for example Kessene, 2000; Quirk and Fort, 1992; Szymanski, 
2003). Moreover, much of this research focuses on American team sports and English 
professional football with little research work being undertaken on so-termed 'minority' sports 
such as rugby league. However, such sports exist and have the ability to generate significant 
financial value through broadcasting and commercial rights packages, have an impact on 
their supporters and are embedded within the communities in which they exist. Failure of 
these clubs, in a financial or sporting sense, can have a significant impact on the club, the 
league and its associated stakeholders. 
Twenty years since its formation, there appear to be significant problems with the rugby 
Super League in the UK as outlined by Howarth and Robinson (2008) and O'Keefe (1999). 
Promotion and relegation were introduced, dropped, and subsequently re-introduced; the 
competition has fluctuated between having 12 and 14 clubs; and a licensing system has been 
introduced and modified. The 2015 structure saw a return to 12 clubs and a new competition 
framework. Following the conclusion of the regular league season, the 24 participating clubs 
(12 from the Super League and 12 from the Championship) compete in a play-off series 
where they are split into three leagues of 8 based upon their league position. Funding for 
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clubs was to be delivered via a tiered system (in both leagues) in an effort to prevent financial 
difficulties resulting from relegation.  
Some of these structural changes were brought about, in part, by off-field issues and financial 
struggles at individual clubs including a high profile double administration for Bradford Bulls, 
one of the successful (in terms of sporting performance) rugby league clubs. Other clubs are 
not immune to the issues faced at Bradford, indeed the vast majority of Super League clubs 
have faced financial problems in recent years with Neil Hudgell (Chairman of Hull Kingston 
Rovers) being very critical of the governing body of the sport; 
 “The governing body continue to invest widely in the expansionist model whilst at the 
 same time seemingly turning a blind eye to the financial instability of many of its elite 
 clubs, mine included" (Neil Hudgell, April 2012). 
Consequently, the primary aim of this paper is to analyse the current state of the UK Super 
League and its member clubs and to understand whether the responses made by the governing 
body, have set the conditions to provide a more attractive product, and if they have not, to 
identify a means by which the league and its clubs can remain attractive thereby fulfilling the 
conceptual requirements of a league association. The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows. The paper first considers the theoretical context of professional team sports before 
considering the literature available on the Super League itself. Following this, the paper 
discusses the methods applied and the findings before concluding the key challenges that the 
sport faces and highlights recommendations for how the sport can become more attractive 
and sustainable. 
The Economic Theory of Professional Sports Leagues 
According to received theory, the perfect game is a symbiotic contest between equally 
matched opponents. The practical economic problem is that professional sports leagues form 
imperfectly competitive natural cartels where games are played between teams with 
asymmetric market power (Vrooman, 2015). This notion implies that dominant teams may 
only be as strong as their weakest opponent. Comparisons between the economic 
environment of professional team sports and that of more traditional commercial businesses 
have been well documented by sports economists (e.g. Dobson and Goddard, 2011; Leach 
and Szymanski, 2015). Professional team sports are intrinsically different from other 
businesses, in which a firm is likely to prosper if it can eliminate competition and establish a 
position as a monopoly supplier (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). In sport, however, it does not 
pay for one team to establish such a position due to the joint nature of 'production' in sports. 
Principally, professional team sports are heavily linked to the concepts of uncertainty of 
outcome, competitive balance and profit and utility maximisation (e.g. Buraimo, Frick and 
Hickfang and Simmons, 2015; Fort, 2015; Kesenne, 2015; Leach and Szymanski, 2015; 
Sloane, 2015; Vrooman, 2015). The theoretical literature on the determinants of the degree of 
competitive inequality in sports leagues was developed by US sports economists, with North 
American team sports primarily in mind. Naturally, the development of this literature has led 
to comparisons between the North American and European model (see Hoehn and Szymanski, 
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1999; Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Sloane, 2006; Szymanski, 2003). The European model is 
and will remain unique, but there appears to be convergence on certain features. In both 
Europe and the United States, sports leagues are joint ventures that can be viewed as a single 
entity. Clubs are separately owned with discretion to set prices, market the games, and adopt 
strategies to compete with other clubs. There are, however, several key differences between 
the two models, all of which ultimately impinge on factors such as revenue generation and 
ability to compete. Firstly, the American sports model operates a draft system where the best 
performing rookie is assigned to the worst performing team. Furthermore, American sports 
leagues operate under salary caps, share television revenue equally and compete exclusively 
in domestically structured leagues (aside from a handful of Canadian franchises) (Andreff 
and Staudohar, 2000). In place of promotion and relegation, evident throughout the European 
model, changes in American leagues come from adding new franchises and relocating 
franchises to another city.  
Precisely why such differences have arisen in the two continents has never been fully 
explained (Sloane, 2015). However, Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) contrast the 
development of baseball and soccer, with the latter spreading throughout the world, first 
under the influence of British expatriates and then by local elites, whereas baseball was much 
more inward looking and concerned with commercial development. Previous literature has 
argued that profit maximisation is the prime objective of North American leagues and team 
owners, so profitability is the main factor influencing decisions concerning the award of 
franchises and relocation (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). Contrastingly, other authors have 
suggested that the European sports model is more closely related to utility or 'win' 
maximisation (see Sloane, 1971; Kesenne, 2000; Garcia-del-Barro and Szymanski, 2006). 
The Super League 
In the 1990's a picture of run-down grounds, poor facilities and financial depression 
compounded the growing lack of interest in rugby league. Many clubs had spiralling wages 
bills and income had remained static. This, coupled with a growing reliance on the governing 
body to pull in sponsorship and money from television deals meant that by the end of the 
1992-93 season, only fourteen clubs had experienced greater average crowds than in the 
previous year and seventeen out of thirty-two clubs were technically insolvent (O'Keeffe, 
1999). Rugby league was in disarray, and in response to the problems came the invention of 
the Super League in 1995. The Super League is stated on its official website as the top-level 
professional rugby league competition in Europe. The Super League currently has fourteen 
teams: thirteen from England and one from France. The Super League began in 1996, 
replacing the RFL Championship and switched from a winter to a summer season. The 
rationale behind the switch to the summer season can be pinpointed to two main reasons. 
Firstly, the influence of the league's main broadcaster (BSkyB) and, secondly, the weather. 
BSkyB was, in 1996, receiving a large number of subscriptions for Premier League football 
in the UK and it did not want to broadcast rugby league during the same time frames. Rather, 
it wanted something for people to subscribe to after the football season had finished. In 
relation to the second main rationale, it was also envisaged that a move to a summer season, 
and more clement weather conditions, would be attractive to spectators. The current format of 
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the Super League season consists of each team playing 27 games between February and 
September; 13 home games and 13 away games and a Magic Weekend game held at a neutral 
venue. At the end of the season, the top 8 teams enter a play-off system leading to a Grand 
Final which determines the champions of the league. 
The Super League began as a closed league (i.e. the scrapping of promotion and relegation) 
featuring 12 teams (the top 10 teams from the original Rugby Football League Championship 
and one team from London and one team from Paris). There was a switch from a traditional 
winter season to a summer season, the introduction of new rules (e.g. video referees) and a 
proposed Britain/Australian World Club Challenge competition at the end of each season. 
This was primarily due to the fact that Rupert Murdoch owned both BSkyB and the 
Australian rugby league franchise and wanted to showcase the two as attractive sporting 
products to drive pay-tv subscriptions. The roots of the Super League were to be the 
principles of American team sports, namely a closed league system, a more equal distribution 
of revenue, salary caps and franchise based clubs. There has been a substantial amount of 
academic debate regarding the potential benefits and respective pitfalls of an open versus a 
closed league system that often brings about comparisons between the North American and 
European model of professional team sports (see for example, see Hoehn and Szymanski, 
1999; Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Sloane, 2006; Szymanski, 2003). The American model 
has earned praise for the financial stability it brings to its clubs and the increased uncertainty 
of outcome it provides for its leagues yet the European model has continued with the 
principle of promotion and relegation in its leagues and a more open format of competition. 
The majority of literature surrounding this area predominantly focuses on the four major 
sports in the American model (American football, baseball, basketball and hockey) and 
football (e.g. Sloane, 1971; Kesenne, 2000; Garcia-del-Barro and Szymanski, 2006; 
Szymanski and Zimbalist, 2005). 
When the Super League was formed, it can be argued that the plan was to take elements from 
both models of professional team sports. Essentially, Rugby League was attempting to 
replicate the English Premier League in football whilst maintaining American team sport 
principles of salary caps and no promotion or relegation (up until the 2014 season). Rugby 
League is, in global terms, a minority sport but has clearly been modernised in recent times 
through the advent of pay TV and other global processes (see Rowe, 1997). Indeed Rugby 
League in England has transformed since the emergence of BSkyB as the Super League 
broadcaster in 1995 and is under heavy pressure to grow, despite a recent £90million 
broadcasting deal to support the elite Super League. Rather like association football, and the 
advent of the FA Premier League (football), traditional sources of finance in the sport were 
lacking and facilities needed upgrading, notwithstanding the fact that the game needed more 
widespread promotion. Key aspects of the deal to create the Super League in 1995 centred on 
a move for the game from a winter to summer sport, that a Super League, similar to the EPL 
should be established and that clubs should be expanded to markets outside traditional 
catchment areas (i.e. outside the M62 corridor). Finally some clubs were to merge to become 
'Super Clubs'. All but the final aspect has been implemented with the growth of the game 
finding limited success. 
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The predicted outcomes of the Super League included, among other things, greater 
uncertainty of outcome, increased attendances, greater revenues for clubs, and higher profits, 
which would ultimately lead to the transformation of rugby league from a northern minority 
sport into a national/international sport on the model of professional football. However, it can 
be argued that the 1990s revolution in English professional team sports made football’s 
Premier League strong financially but has not had the same effect across the rest of football 
or in other professional team sports. Football now has a larger share of both the total 
spectator audience (live+TV) and of the total resources available to all professional team 
sports. It is possible that rugby league, in taking both elements of open and closed leagues, 
got it wrong in the first instance. For instance, different leagues could require different 
business models. The competitive nature of the business models applied to professional team 
sports in the UK in the 1990s, which saw the application of similar models across certain 
sports, has arguably led to a further fragmentation of the sports industry and the competitive 
balance swing towards the most high profile sport entity (elite club football) over other more 
niche products (e.g. rugby and cricket). The benefits to football have come at the detriment to 
other professional team sports and it was argued back in the early 2000s (O’Keeffe, 1999) 
that rugby league, rugby union, cricket and some parts of the Football League face serious 
financial threats over the next decade. It appears that some of these threats still remain today, 
particularly for rugby league, given some of the context above. 
The Super League and Broadcasting Deals 
The initial sale of broadcasting rights for the Super League was to BSkyB in 1995 who paid 
£87m over 5 years. Initially, the Super League was made up of 12 teams (the top 10 teams 
from the old RFL Championship First Division plus one team from London and one team 
from Paris). The RFL decided that teams in the Super League would each be given £900,000 
a year, significantly more than those in the two lower divisions. This is in keeping with the 
European model of professional team sports in the sense that distributions of revenue from 
revenue from broadcasting are shared between a number of divisions, although not evenly. In 
the American model, revenue is distributed solely within one league which again underlines 
how rugby league was attempting to merge elements of both models with the formation of the 
Super League. As previously stated, the principle behind selling to the broadcasting rights to 
BSkyB was to mirror the approach taken in English football who in 1992 re-named their top 
division the Premier League and negotiated a £304m deal for the exclusive live coverage of 
games with the same provider (Cashmore, 1996). 
However, unlike English football and the Premier League, rugby league and the Super 
League have failed to grow and expand the game both on and off the field. EPL domestic 
broadcasting rights contracts will have generated around £3.4 billion over the three seasons 
from 2013/14 (an increase of around 60% on the previous cycle) whilst overseas broadcast 
rights covering over 200 countries will have generated £2.2 billion during the same period 
(an increase of over 50% on the previous cycle) (Deloitte, 2014). At the time of writing 
(2015), the next round of broadcasting rights is due to be finalised from the 2016/17 season 
onwards and commentators are again suggesting that we could see an increase in the value 
yet again due to the commercial power of the league and the emergence of new players in the 
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market in recent years such as BT Sport. In contrast, the latest broadcasting deal for the Super 
League, once again with BSkyB, is worth around £200m over five years from the start of the 
2017 season. This means there is a ratio difference between these two elite leagues in their 
respective sports of 17:1 in favour of the EPL in football. 
It must be noted here that football is a far more popular sport in the UK than rugby league but 
considering the formation of the Super League attempted to mirror the EPL, it is clear that the 
sport has not progressed as well as it set out to do in 1995. The latest broadcast deal does 
provide a £73m increase on the previous deal but there are also concerns about the deal from 
owners of Super League clubs. Wigan chairman Ian Lenagan has been critical of the thinking 
process behind the new deal and Salford owner Marwan Koukash voted against the deal 
stating that "you do not commit to a single broadcaster for a period of eight years at a time 
when there are other players in the field" (BBC Sport, 2014). The deal has also been labelled 
to be purely for "short-term gain" and people within the game are concerned that "nobody 
looked ahead" when agreeing the deal. There is a further issue which is directly related to the 
revenue streams in professional team and that is an overreliance on broadcasting income. 
Large broadcasting deals are undoubtedly beneficial but they do come attached with wealth 
warnings particularly in the minority sports where public exposure is so critical to sustaining 
the professional game. Having a broadcasting deal exclusively with Pay-Tv broadcasters 
instantly prevents the game from being available to a substantial proportion of the 
populations. This, in turn, could have a subsequent knock-on effect on matchday attendances 
and commercial spending from fans. Rugby league itself has suffered from this at the 
beginning of the Super League when the broadcasting deal meant that live rugby league was 
no longer shown on the BBC's Grandstand program on a Saturday afternoon. As a result, 
viewing figures fell sharply from around 1.3m to around 250,000. Declining attendances and 
participation have been a reoccurring theme in rugby league (see O’Keeffe, 1999) such 
factors should cause concern for the directors of the RFL and the Super League. It is 
interesting to note that at the time of writing (2015), the sports other code, rugby union, are 
discussing the possibility of selling their rights package for the RBS 6 Nations tournament 
(currently available on free-to-air television) to a Pay-Tv company from 2017. With specific 
reference to team sports in the UK, football has the largest share of both the total spectator 
audience (live and television) and of the total resources available to all professional team 
sports. It was stated back at the turn of the millennium that rugby league, rugby union and 
cricket faced serious financial threats over the course of the following decade and it is 
arguable that the same threat is still very much applicable at the present time. 
The 'New' Environment for Rugby League 
The 'new' environment in rugby league (see figure 1) outlines how the landscape has changed 
since the 1990's. Rugby league has grown its revenue stream, but continues to be hindered by 
spiralling expenses and debt levels. The Super League and RFL seem relatively inactive but it 
is clear that many clubs will need to reinvent their business models, whether in a period of 
economic uncertainty or not. 
< Figure 1about here>  
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Like many professional team sports, Rugby League and the Super League in particular find 
that financial discipline is an essential element to successfully grow the game both on and off 
the pitch. It is a measure which, among other things, seeks to manage a salary cap, determine 
licences and extend the reach of the league into competitions which support the Super League 
system. Like many professional sports leagues the Super League looks to America as a model 
of how to manage and govern yet almost 20 years since the advent of the Super League clubs 
have been troubled off the pitch, most recently Bradford Bulls (twice), Salford and the 
London Broncos. In light of the discussion put forward in the literature review and the 
problems that the game appears to be facing, is it perhaps a pertinent time to assess how 
rugby league is performing both and on and off the field of play. 
Methodology 
Data for this research was obtained by dissecting the annual accounts of 10 clubs between 
2006 and 2012.  Financial data was not available for four clubs (Salford, Warrington, Widnes 
and Catalan). The reasons behind these omissions were that the accounts for Salford, 
Warrington and Widnes had not been filed and, where partial accounts had been filed, they 
contained minimal financial information. In the case of Catalan, accounts were unavailable 
due to the club being registered outside of the UK. Partial data was available for Bradford 
(2006-2010 in respect of the time period for financial information (2006-2012)). 
Analysis was performed using recognised industry techniques (see Wilson, Plumley and 
Ramchandani, 2013). Financial results were analysed in relation to the five key areas of 
financial performance – all relevant to professional sports clubs and investment. These were; 
growth, profitability, ROCE (Return on Capital Employed), liquidity and defensive 
positioning. The first three indicators relate to an organisation’s ability to generate profit and 
return for its owners and also to maintain a sustainable future. The latter relate to an 
organisation’s ability to meet its liabilities as they fall due and also how certain organisations 
are financed and how much capital is made up of debt finance. Alternative models for 
analysing performance in professional team sports have been excluded on the basis of 
accessibility to data, particularly in relation to the financial statements of rugby league clubs. 
Chadwick (2009) outlined that performance measurement in sport has to include both the 
financial and the non-financial and it is important that this paper considered non-financial 
factors as well when analysing the current state of the game. It is this holistic approach to 
data collection and analysis that is the key benefit from a methodological perspective and it 
also provides a further robustness to the succeeding results and discussion. 
To that end, the Active People Survey was used to determine levels of participation and 
match day attendance data obtained to determine the level of stadium utilisation. As a 
performance indicator, attendance reflects demand for professional rugby league in the 
marketplace, and has the advantage of being objective and consistent.  Ticket sales driven by 
this demand provide the main source of income for clubs, which remains a significant income 
stream, despite the increasing scale of successive television rights deals. 
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It is acknowledged that there may be methodological concerns regarding the collection of 
attendance data (due largely to the inclusion by some clubs of non-attending season tickets in 
routine attendance figures). However, there is at least sufficient data in the public domain to 
enable comparisons to be made between clubs and over time. This paper considers attendance 
data available through the Rugby League Project site. Average attendance data was 
considered for all clubs since the inception of the Super League to track trends over time. A 
separate piece of analysis was also conducted to present the impact of the 'Magic Weekend' 
and Grand Final attendance on the sport.  
Additionally, analysing the Active People Survey (APS) allows us to track participation rates 
in the sport, which has links to the future of the game, not only in relation new players, but 
also the emergence of the next generation of fans that will drive attendance demand. APS 
data was considered since the formation of APS 1 in 2005/2006 and covers all eight iterations 
of the survey inclusive of the 2013/2014 report. APS data in this paper is presented on both a 
national and regional level to consider the assumption that rugby league has traditionally 
been a sport that has gained more attention in the northern heartlands of the UK. This three 
tiered approach to data collection and analysis allows us to present a holistic picture of the 
performance of rugby league and Super League clubs both on and off the pitch. 
Results  
Considering Financial Health 
The headline findings from the dataset indicate a financial disparity amongst rugby league 
clubs which has increased during the last 6 years that were analysed. When the averages are 
considered, the figures appear relatively stable. The total average debt for the 10 clubs for 
2006-2012 was around £4.7m whilst the average revenue for the 7 clubs where figures were 
available stood at £4.5m. However, these averages are somewhat inflated by certain clubs, 
particularly the revenue figures. The more successful clubs, on the pitch, in recent years, 
namely Leeds Rhinos, Wigan Warriors, St. Helens and, to a lesser extent, Huddersfield 
Giants have all seen increases in revenue during the time period analysed with Leeds Rhinos 
and St. Helens having average revenues of £10.5m and £9.4m respectively. Furthermore, 
these clubs own their own stadium or, in Wigan’s case, share a stadium with a football club. 
Consequently, the value of their fixed assets is higher and they have better liquidity. 
However, in stark contrast there are some clubs where debt substantially exceeds revenues. 
The one franchise club based in London (London Broncos), for example, had an average 
turnover of £1.8m exceeded by an average debt of £7.2m. Moreover, this debt appears to be 
increasing with the most recent set of accounts showing debt levels of £13.3m against 
revenue of £1.6m. It is a similar story at clubs such as Hull FC, Hull KR and Castleford 
Tigers who all have problems with debt and not enough value in their assets to cover the debt 
compared to other rugby league clubs. The figures in this study suggest a paradox between 
the more established clubs that own their own stadium and can use such a stadium to generate 
secondary income and the smaller clubs who have fewer assets and may not own their own 
stadium. There is a clear problem with debt in rugby league and although this is true for a 
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number of professional team sports, there is a clear disparity amongst clubs having the 
financial capability to manage and eradicate the debt. 
<Table 1 about here>  
The problem with debt in rugby league clubs is further highlighted in table 1. This table 
shows the debt ratio figures (taken from the balance sheet) in percentage terms for all clubs 
across all years studied. All clubs, with the exception of Leeds and Warrington, recorded 
worryingly high debt ratios, with some clubs posting figures of over 100% in certain years. 
The ratio figures returned by London Broncos are indicative of the discussion above. The 
club has large levels of debt compared to their respective revenue figures and are currently 
operating under an unsustainable business model. The contrast between the larger more 
established Super League clubs and the lesser clubs is further exposed in figure 2. This figure 
charts the average revenue and average debt across all clubs and also highlights the revenue 
and debt figures for Leeds and London, clubs at opposite ends of the financial spectrum. Two 
clear patterns are evident in figure 2. First, the revenue figures for Leeds are above average, 
indicating the relevant on-field success of the club leading to higher revenues. In contrast, 
London's inability to attract fans to their matches coupled with poorer on-field performance 
means that their revenue trend figures are substantially below average. Secondly, the debt 
levels at Leeds appear to be decreasing when compared to the rest of the league whereas the 
debt levels at London have considerably increased in recent years. 
<Figure 2 about here>  
 
Given the problems that Super League have had with securing lucrative broadcasting deals 
for their clubs and the fact that the commercial and spectator appeal of the sport remains an 
issue (as outlined in the extant literature), the importance of match day attendances in driving 
club revenues is more important in rugby league than in other team sports in the UK, 
particularly those that have a bigger commercial profile such as football and rugby union. In 
light of this, the attendances of Super League clubs merits further discussion in line with the 
aim of the paper. 
The importance of attendances to drive revenues of Super League clubs 
There has been significant attention placed on attendances in professional team sport, 
including that in the Super League and particularly since its inception (e.g. O’Keeffe, 1999), 
as a result of the move to a summer season. As previously stated, the switch in playing season 
was thought to be justified by a predicted increase in crowd sizes overall, as spectators took 
advantage of more clement weather. Simultaneously, demand was predicted to rise as a result 
of higher playing standards, due in part to better ground conditions. Figure 3 shows the 
average home ground attendance for the league as a whole between 1996 and 2014. Magic 
Weekend and Grand Final fixtures are played at neutral venues, and data for these are 
considered separately at a later point in the paper. 
< Figure 3 about here>  
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From a starting point of just over 6,500 spectators per game in 1996, average attendance rose 
steadily to a peak of just under 10,000 in 2007. Since then, the average home attendance at 
Super League match has fallen slowly but equally steadily, to just over 8,500 in 2014. As 
Table 2 demonstrates, overall attendances are significantly higher than in 1996 (p = 0.05).  
This overall figure hides significant variations between clubs however, illustrated by the 
contrasting fortunes of three of the league's original teams; Bradford Bulls, Leeds Rhinos and 
London Broncos. 
< Table 2 about here>  
Over the first eight Super League seasons, Bradford Bulls were the best supported club, on 
five occasions, averaging over 10,300 spectators per home game in 1996, rising to 15,284 in 
2003. This was a period of consistent success for the Bulls, as they won four super League 
titles and finished third three times. Thereafter however, attendances fell consistently year on 
year, with the exception of 2007 and 2011. From 2009 onwards, the club finished in the 
bottom half of the Super League table, culminating in relegation from the league in 2014, and 
this is reflected in an average home attendance for that season of less than 7,000 spectators. 
This was coupled by the financial problems that Bradford was also facing at the time. The 
financial data that was available for the club for the purpose of this paper showed that the 
average revenue for Bradford for the years 2006-2010 was £4.75m. However, during that 
time the club failed to generate a profit of over £226,000. Problems with debt and non-
payment to creditors meant that the club have been in administration two times in the last two 
years (BBC Sport, 2014) and the club must now look to build a more sustainable business 
model moving forward if they are to return to the Super League.  
Near neighbours Leeds Rhinos, by contrast, have been one of the most consistently well-
supported clubs in Super League, achieving the highest average home attendance on twelve 
occasions. Indeed, attendances more than doubled between 1996 (8,581) and the peak year of 
2007 (17,416 - coincidentally, the league's highest ever figure). While average crowd sizes 
have since fallen to around 14,500, this is still significantly above the league average, and 
represents 65% of the available capacity at Leeds' Headingley ground. Unsurprisingly, Leeds 
Rhinos have also been one of the most successful clubs in recent years with an average 
league finishing position of 3.4 during the last nine seasons. 
One of the objectives of Super League was to expand the spatial extent of the league beyond 
its traditional heartland in the North of England. To that end, the London Broncos were 
included as an expansion club from the first year, along with the short-lived Paris St. 
Germain. Initially, attendances compared favourably with the league average, averaging 
5,699 in the first year and 5,125 in 1997. London's attendances only averaged more than 
5,000 for one season (2010) after this point however. Further, in the 17 subsequent seasons, 
London Broncos had the lowest average attendance in Super League 13 times. Their final 
season in the league (2014) brought the lowest ever average attendance of any club in Super 
League's history (1,294). London and Bradford are now playing in the second tier 
Championship competition, having been relegated from Super League at the end of the 2014 
season. 
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The overall attendance picture is one of steady growth up to 2007, followed by a period of 
relative stagnation. While attendances are significantly higher than the original Super League 
season, there has been little if any sustained growth since 2003, when average attendances 
breached the 8,000 barrier for the first time. As the three examples cited above show, there is 
considerable variation between clubs, with poor attendances affecting even traditionally well-
supported teams like Bradford Bulls. Clubs who are able to grow and sustain their regular 
fanbase are therefore in a much better position to benefit from the primary matchday revenue 
stream of ticket sales, along with the secondary streams of merchandise and refreshment 
which are associated with live attendance at professional sports events. 
<Figure 4 about here>  
One of the principles of Super League is the use of innovative marketing techniques to 
promote the game. Foremost among these is the concept of the play-off system to decide the 
overall championship title. In addition, since 2007, one round of matches has been played at a 
neutral venue each season, to provide a showcase for the sport known as the Magic Weekend. 
These one-off events generate attendances on a much larger scale than conventional home 
fixtures, as demonstrated by Figure 4. 
Grand Final attendances have risen over time since 1998, up to a peak in 2006 for the game 
between St Helens and Hull. The final typically uses over 90% of the stadium's capacity, with 
an average attendance over 17 seasons of 68,889. The Magic Weekend operates under a 
different premise, with fixtures replicating local derby games at the neutral venue to 
encourage ticket sales. Supporters are invited to watch more than one game on the day that 
they attend, but there is no official data recording crowd figures for individual fixtures, as this 
would be impractical. Nevertheless, crowd sizes have averaged 30,487 since 2007, with three 
of the highest figures being recorded over the last three seasons. 
It is interesting to note that the Magic Weekend has used several venues over the course of its 
history, with Cardiff's Millenium Stadium and Edinburgh's Murrayfield sharing hosting 
duties up to 2011. Over this period the capacity utilisation rate was just over 40%. Since 2012 
however, the fixtures have been played at Manchester's Etihad Stadium, which has a smaller 
capacity (46,708) than the other two stadia, though with slightly higher attendances this has 
generated a much higher utilisation rate of just under 70% on average. 
This serves to demonstrate that demand for professional Rugby League is occasionally 
sufficient to sustain large crowds comparable in size to Premier League football. However, 
while Figure 4 demonstrates that these innovations appear to have been embedded in the 
Super League cycle, this must be viewed in the context of declining attendances at regular 
season home games. Super League clubs must place more emphasis on sustaining core 
attendances consistently throughout the season rather than relying on one-off showcase 
events to drive revenues. It is also equally pertinent to stress that the Magic Weekend, whilst 
well-attended, needs to be set-up very carefully to ensure that clubs do not miss out on their 
traditional attendance revenues. 
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One final problem that compounds the disappointing picture for Super League clubs and 
rugby league more generally at the present time is the expressed demand for the game, 
measured by the participation rates. To that end, the paper uses data from Sport England's 
Active People Survey to review the current levels of participation in the game. The standard 
measures of demand in the Active People Survey are weekly and 4-weekly participation. 
Figure 5 presents the data for Rugby League since 2006. 
<Figure 5 about here>  
It is immediately apparent that since the peak of APS 2, the overall trend for Rugby League 
participation is downwards. Two points are of particular note. First, according to the survey 
results, the number of people playing Rugby League once a week in 2013/14 is less than half 
the total in the first iteration of the survey. Second, the overall number of people playing 
Rugby League at least once in a four week period is lower than the weekly participation 
figure for the first year of the survey (2005/6). There has therefore been a significant fall in 
the participation rate for Rugby League. 
Taken at face value, the data are of particular concern to a sport which continuously seeks to 
expand its player base in order to maintain its viability. Indeed, one of the aims behind 
establishing a team in London was to promote the game to potential participants in the capital.  
Figure 6 shows 4-weekly participation in Rugby League by region, demonstrating that the 
national trends in demand are reflected at regional level. Even in the Rugby League 
heartlands of Yorkshire and North West England, participation has fallen since 2007/08, to 
the extent that regional participation data are not available for the latest iteration of the survey. 
<Figure 6 about here>  
Admittedly, a decrease in participation since 2007/08 is something that has affected a number 
of team sports. In relation to similar niche sports in the UK (e.g. rugby union and cricket), 
rugby league has experienced similar decreases in terms of the absolute population figures 
who take part in any sport. Cricket has seen a decrease of 74,100 people in terms of any 
participation in the sport between 2008-2012 whilst rugby union and rugby league have seen 
decreases of 49,000 and 49,200, in absolute terms, respectively. However, in relative terms 
the reduction in participation presents a fundamental problem for rugby league. The number 
of people participating is only around a third of the total participation in rugby union and a 
fourth of the total participation in cricket. It is this small participation base that presents a 
significant issue for the sport's governing body. 
It is possible that one of the potential external factors that has contributed to the decrease in 
participation in team sports since 2008 may have been the UK recession which occurred 
around a similar time. The recession had an impact on leisure time and the costs associated 
with leisure time. Subsequently, there has been a shift, in recent years, towards participation 
in individual, more informal, low cost sporting activities such as running and cycling rather 
than communal team sports, although it must also be noted that sports participation on the 
whole in the UK has declined slightly since 2008. 
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Is the RFL doing enough? 
The problems outlined in this paper, in relation to poor financial management and declining 
attendances and participation levels is not a problem that it is exclusive to rugby league. Most 
team sports, at some stage, felt the effects of the recession and have had to strategically re-
align in order to sustain and grow. The problem for rugby league is that most team sports 
have managed to ride out the recession and have remained relatively intact. They have done 
this in part by undertaking aggressive strategies that have developed modified versions of 
their own game (for example, T20 cricket, rugby sevens, rush hockey and 'back to netball'). 
In short, other sports have 'adapted their offer'. Rugby league, by contrast, has struggled to 
develop their game to make it a more attractive proposition to fans and there is widespread 
concern that the change in league structure (commencing in the 2015/2016 season) will be 
too late. Essentially, the league appears to need more revolutionary change not a structural 
alteration, particularly given that it is already behind its nearest competitors in terms of 
baseline participation and attendance figures. 
The main issue, however, is buried within economics and the simple equation of supply and 
demand. Rugby league is a northern sport that has failed to grow out of its heartland - a place 
where the recession also had significantly more impact than other parts of the country. The 
sport does not currently have the financial resources of its more illustrious counterparts of 
rugby union and football. It does, however, generate significant broadcasting money, which it 
could distribute differently to improve competition in the league. For example, the league 
could consider unequal distribution of television revenue whereby the club finishing bottom 
receives a larger share of the revenue than the club finishing top. This would provide smaller 
clubs generating lower revenues, therefore finishing lower down the league, with more 
opportunity to spend money on better playing talent, thus improving its competitiveness on 
the field of play, its attractiveness to supporters and a higher degree of uncertainty of 
outcome in the matches that it contests.  
The salary cap remains a problem, as the sport struggles to attract and maintain better players, 
meaning that the fans ultimately have a less attractive product to consume. The RFL must 
adapt and find new ways to grow the sport through participation initiatives that are aimed at 
developing the next generation of players and fans, allowing the game to remain sustainable 
in the future. An increase in the salary cap linked to the change in revenue distribution will 
lead to higher playing budgets and therefore better playing talent in the league. This in turn 
will make the game more attractive as a product to broadcasters and spectators who will pay 
more to consume the league. 
Finally, the RFL need to be more strategic in their approach to growing participation and they 
can achieve this by incentivising clubs financially to improve their community schemes and 
outreach activity. There is the requirement of the league and its governing body to maintain a 
sustained level of competition amongst its member clubs in line with the theoretical 
determinants of what makes an attractive sports league considering the 'joint' production 
nature of professional team sports (see Borland and McDonald, 2003; Dobson and Goddard, 
2011; El-Hodiri and Quirk, 1971; Hogan et al., 2013; Neale, 1964).  
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Whilst the 'joint' production nature of professional team sports is of prime importance, there 
is a need for the member clubs individually to support the governing body to achieve its 
objectives and that they begin to operate in a more prudent financial manner. Of equal 
importance, is the need for clubs to be more autonomous with facility use, thus increasing the 
opportunity for secondary spend and additional revenue. Presently, a number of super league 
clubs play their matches in stadiums owned by professional football clubs and, as such, these 
clubs may be missing the opportunity of a potentially lucrative revenue stream whilst also 
losing further financial ground on some of their competitors in the league. 
Concluding Comment 
This paper has provided a valuable contribution to the study of league production away from 
American team sports and football. Rugby league takes its origins from both the European 
and American models of professional team sports and this study therefore provides a timely 
and significant contribution to the evaluation of professional sports leagues and clubs. This 
paper also contributes to extant literature that has documented the issues in professional team 
sports in the UK in recent years such as football (e.g. Buraimo, Simmons and Szymanski, 
2006; Wilson, Plumley and Ramchandani, 2013), cricket (e.g. Shibli and Wilkinson-Riddle, 
1997) and rugby union (e.g. Hogan et al., 2013; O'Brien and Slack, 1999, 2003) and the 
findings in this paper are consistent with the findings of these authors. 
The paper indicates that there remains a problem with the attractiveness of the Super League 
which is a product of poor financial management at club level and reluctance by the RFL to 
undertake radical structural change. The study focused on three specific measures of 
performance that included financial indicators, match-day attendances and participation to 
provide a holistic overview of the current state of play at rugby league clubs. Individually, 
each indicator paints an austere picture. For example, in general terms, revenues are not high 
enough to generate sufficient growth within the game. Coupled with this is the fact that 
attendances, across all clubs, are stagnating, with the exception of one-off major events (e.g. 
'Magic Weekend’, Grand Final). However, an increased attendance at these one-off events is 
on its own not enough to drive attendances. Furthermore, lower attendance figures do not 
encourage a growth in financial health given that attendance figures are the main source of 
income generation for the majority of clubs. The vicious circle is completed by the fact that 
expressed demand for the game, measured by participation figures, is low and has been on a 
declining trend for the last ten years. 
In summary, with reference to rugby league, the paper concludes that the Super League is 
still coming up short in relation to its objectives outlined in the early part of this paper. The 
creation of the Super League in 1996, formed using some of the principles present in the 
American team sports model, was supposed to herald a new era for rugby league. However, 
by not adopting one model or the other in its entirety has meant that the league and its 
member clubs have suffered. Instead of having a prosperous, growing and profitable league, 
the picture is instead one of financial insecurity for a majority of clubs, stagnating 
attendances and declining participation. The league needs to rid itself of structural ambiguity 
and adopt the American model of professional team sport more firmly. 
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However, it would be unfair to suggest that issues with financial performance are exclusive to 
rugby league clubs and comparisons with other professional team sports will be evident. 
Indeed, other leagues do experience similar problems. However, such comparisons to sports 
such as football are less relevant given that attendance figures and participation levels in that 
sport are the highest they have ever been. Additionally, the money associated with 
professional football in line with broadcasting deals and club income streams is a level far 
above rugby league clubs at the present time. The Super League set itself a series of 
objectives when it was formed in 1995. The results in this paper demonstrate that despite 
twenty years of history and a number of structural changes, in general terms, the clubs 
competing in the Super League are failing to generate profits, expand the supporter base or 
grow commercial revenues with a better national and international profile. Participation in the 
sport is at an all-time low and the game has not grown beyond its heartlands. This all points 
to a bleak future and that, in line with the objectives that the Super League set itself in 1995, 
rugby league needs to produce a sustainable business model and if it does not its clubs, and in 
the turn the sport, will die. 
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